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COMMENTARY 
MUTINY OVER .STRICT SCRUTINY? INTERPRETING THE 
JUDICIAL APPROACH TO RACE-CONSCIOUS HIGHER 
. . · EDU.CATION ADMISSION POLICIES* . 
by 
. DAVID H.K. NGUYEN, MBA, JD, LL.M, ADV.; PH.D . 
. AND LAWANDA WARD, JD, PH.D. CANO," 
Introduction 
During the United States Supreme Court's 2015-16 term, Fisher v. 
University of Tqas at Austin' (hereinafter referred to as Fisher I and Fisher II) 
, was heard· for· 'a second time. Tiie main issue in this case centered on 'the 
qlle$lion 'of whether the University's' implementation of its adfoissfons plan, 
in ·conj11nction with 'the state's 'Top Ten Percent Law,' meds the two:prong 
strict scrutiny standard of first, being a compelling state interest and second, 
a narrowly tailored means ito meet 'thh' stated objective. Under the Top Ten 
Percent Law high school students who graduate in the top· ten percent of 
their class are eligible for automatic· admission to any public college or 
university in Texas.' In its 2013 ·. ruling in Risher I, the Supreme Court 
surmised that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the 
strict · scrutiny analysis to the .contested plan. The .Fifth Circuit Court , of 
Appeals ruled in the first appearance of Fisher I in 2011 and the second in 
2014 that the University's admissions format is constitutionally sound based 
on a strict scrutiny analysis. Since the application of the doctrinal framework 
for strict scrutiny is at odds between the high com't and the Fifth Circuit, the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Fisher II is of great interest. · · 
In this article using colorblind discourse as a theoretical framework, we 
posit why the Supreme Court accepted Fisher I for a second time especially in 
light of justiciability qw;,stions regarding the "troublesome threshold issues 
relating to standing and moottiess,"4 analyze the Court's Fisher II •oral 
* The vie,Vs expresse;d a~e those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the publisher. Cite as 331 Ed.Law Rep. [1] 
(July 28, 2016). 
"'~ David Nguyen is an Assistant Professor of 
, ~ducation Leadership and Affiliate-" Assis-
t!\nt Professor of Law at the University of 
North Dakota and can be reached at david. 
hk.nguyen@und.edu. Lawanda Ward is a 
. Higher Education & Student Affairs doctor-
• 1_ al candidate at Indiana University and can 
· be reached at lwward.@iupui.edu, Both re-
~eatch a~d examine how laws and policies 
impact and address student access and suc-
cess in higher education. 
1. Fisher ·v. Univ. of Tex. at AuStin, 133 S.Ct. 
2411, 293 Ed.Law Rep. 588 (2013) ("Fisher 
·.I"); Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 
· No. 09-50822 (5th Cir. July · ts, 2014) 
("Fisher II"),' ·available at: http://wwW.ca5. 
uscourts.gOv/opinions/pub/09/09-50822-CV 
2.pdf. 
2. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (West 
2009) ("Texas Top Ten Percent Law") 
3. Id. 
4. Girardeau A. Spann, Whatever. 65 Van. L. 
Rev. 203, 204 (2012). 
[1] 
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EDUCATION LAW REPORTER 
arguments, and share best practices on what higher education institutions can legally do to continue admitting and retaining people of color. Some legal scholars have argued that th.e Supreme Court has adopted a colorblind constitutionalism,' whicl1 is "a collection of legal themes function-ing as a racial ideology"' that operates as "treating race as if it were, like eye color, a wholly irrelevant c11aracteristic."7 Colorblindness is maintained and perpetuated by the denial of race as a social and cultural definer; If race)s reduced to one's imagination or a fs1r-fetcljed ratiopale f9r claims. pfinequ)ty, candid discussions about race are ignored .or refogated to. lacking substantive meaning. ' 
· · · · · 
This article begins.with a brief synopsis. of the,seminal Supreme Court race-conscious higher education admissions caseJi, dealing with the elimina-tion of affirmative action practices in higher education, such as Regents of the Unive1:rity of Califomia v. Bakke, 8 Gmtter v. Bollinger,'· Gratz v. Bo/linge,;1° and Fisher f. Additionally, ,legal clai.ms. snbsequent to Fishe,· I,, such as Fisher II, Student~ Joi- Fair Admissions y, . Hmvai'flc llnive,~ityll ,anq ~ti11tents for, Fair Aqmissions y, Univer~ity of No,th Carol/na.,,Chapel Hi/I, u will)v explored. In order ,tC?, provjde a foundation for oµr analysi~, this article ,yin 11lso pr9xide a prhper on co)orblind discourse .and apply)! to intyrprqt, .the Supryme G'?urt's raqe-conscious higher education ~dmissions cases. The ar.tjde then;wlll briefly expand on \he implications of Fisher i{ ,a11'd pest ,p_ractic~s 'for ipstHut,hms to conthme recruiting, admitting, ancl. enrolling sfodents of color. . . • . - . .\ ' .,,., •.• , ',· I 
-,,1' Legal Bal'kgrouud 011. Race-Con~.cious /\!!missions, , Opponents of race-c0nscious admissions•programs I\ave atgued .that they violate the Equal Protection C::Iause of-the Fourteenth Amendment since they consider, race in admitting students. Under, the .Equal Protection Clause of the U.S Constitution, "no•,State shall ,· .. deqy to ''any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the Iaws,"13 or "similar.individuals,,,,, be dealt with in a similar manner by the govemment.»'1,,In·:order to determine the constitutionality of a , government' act, courts must apply, one of three standards of judicial review-strict scrutiny,,. mid-level scrutiny, or rational basis.15 
. 
. 
" , . Because the use.of race is in.que~,tio~ il] current race-co~scjous,.admis. sions cases, .courts nnrn/ fl)lploy the strict scrµtiqy standard when they decide whether the admissions policy w~s const\tu(io11al. Strict s~~utiny is ,the ut,most 
S. Neil Got~pda, A CJitique of "Our Constitu. 
,..t!q11.is Bl(nd". 44 Stan .. L. Rev,.), .68 (1991); Qirard~au,·A. Span,Il, __ Wfia(e11er. ,62 Va_n .. L. Rev. 203,209 (2012); David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness. $up. Ct .. Rev. 99, 13.4 (1986): Laurence Ii, Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be 
. Colorblind? 20 The J. Marshall L. Rev, 201, 207 (1986), 
6. See Gotanda, su~ra not~ 5 ~t 2. 
7. See Strauss, supra note 5 at 114. 
8. 438 U,S, 265, 57 L.Ed,2d' 750 (1978) ("Bakke"), 
[2] 
9: 5,39 U.S. 306, 1771/<1,Law ,flep, 801 {2Q03) 
_("Gmttef') . . '·,•. :. , . , ._,, 10, 539 U.S. 244, 177 Ed.Law •Rep, 851 (2003) ("Gratz"). 
.,. ·I,, 
11,, No., 1:14cev-14176 (D. Mass. filed Nov, 17, 2014). 
12. · No, . l:14-CV-00954'-U'.B.:JL\V 
'(M.D.N.C. filed Nov: 17, 2014). 
13, u:s, CoNST, amend.:XJV, §1', 
14, · 'R. .ROTUNDA & J,NciWAK; TREATISE CoNSTl-Wl10NAL LAW§ 18,2 at 208 (3d'ed, 1999), 1~'. -f~e gJnei'a/6•, .,,it suiLIVA·!'i &, 'd.' GUNTHER, coNSTiruTioNAL LAW (17th ed. 2010). 
. • 
.I· 
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MUTINY OVER,STRICT'SCRUTINY? 
stringent standard of review l,!Sed by the courts and the most demanding o
f 
the reviews to satisfy; Strict' scrutiny is also ;required in government, acts
 
concerning discrimination ·based on· natidnal brigin;ireligion; and ,al[enage, In 
order to pass strict scrutiny, the ·government must first ,illustrate that its acl!td
 · 
treat,people differently·is1justifiedby·a compelling state interest}',As the:law 
currently stands,• the Supreme Court ·has found thaf;the ·promotion; o
f 
diversity in higher. education k a "compelling,, state interest.!',11 Seccindly, 
under the strict scrutiny standard, all courts must , also find,: thakrace
; 
conscious admissions policies are "narrowly tailored(l',In order to be.constitu, 
tional, a government act employing r1;1cial cl~ssifications mµst satisfy both
 
prongs.18 There havebeen four cases that have icostablished the precedence fo
r 
this interpretation 6v~r t]1e J?aSt s~vefrtl decade~;' Tbese da'ses are britlfly 
• o,' · ' ·,. 
· , .-1-1 .• ;· . ., ,, · ·;,. ,',!·:( 
dts~ussed below. . . , , . ·, · .. • . ,, ., . , 
, ' • , , 
• , ' 
•--'..--: .- _;, ,, ·,•·: "''''-' I .• , •• )J 
''. ; "\ 
.Regents of the Unive,sity of Cq/iforn.iq v, B,akke 
Regents of the' University Df California v:,:Bakke19 was, the first Supreme 
Court case ·that set, the foundation for'•race-conscious, admissions. The
 
University of California Dayis Medical':School"consideted race• in,<its •admis
-
sions practiceS' by strictly setting aside•sixteen 'oµt of 100 seats,fot,,'.'economi
-
cally and educationally disadvantaged applicants• and m\lmpers of, a minority
 
group (Blacks, Chicanos; Asian·:Americans and· American,ilnilians)".
211 A 
. White'male• applicant, Allan Bakke, who was rejected• t\Vice,.by,the medical 
school claimed that he was denied. admissiori because of his· ,ra¢e in violation 
of tlle Equal Protection Clause;'1 · Bakke argued that the .ffiedical. • schoo
l 
accepted less qualified facial minority applicants since the minority students
 
who' filled the sixteen spots :had lower GPAs and test scores than otherwis
e 
rejected White •students.'' While the· Supreme Court found the ,medical 
scHool's race-conscious policy unconstitutional• because reserving· 'a' specifi
c 
number. of seats to be filled •only by •minorities was not narrowly tailared,13
 
the'Court reversed the·lower court's·ruling thartace·could never be ·consid
-
ered a factor in admissions programs as Justice Powell noted that diversity is
 
critic.al to train future, leaders. It is., .a ,compe.1\ing ,gtate interest·, to have a 
\Jroaderdefinition of diversity where,rac<), and.,etlmicity are important factors 
along witb. other qualifications and charactedstics?' Additiqµally, an admis
-
sions: program, may· consider .diversity,.holistically whH<, examining, an .admis
-
sions, application.25 After. Bakke, sqme. universities were still uncertain how 
race coul(I be t)Sed in admissions.26 Nevertheless, cq\leges, universities, law 
16. See id. 
I>'. 
17, See G1:utt,1; 539, l/,S .. at}26, 
181. Adamnd Constructol'i, Inc.- ·v.: Pena, 515 . 
U.s, 200, 227, 132 L.Ed.2q 15.8 (\995). 
19. 438 U.S. 265, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978). 
20, Id. 
21. Id. at 266. 
22. See id. 
23, Suzanne E. Eckes, Race•Con'scious Ad-
missUms Programs: Where Do Universities Go , 
from Gratz and Grutter? 33 J .L. & Educ. 21, 
23 (2004); See also Bakke, 438 U,S. at 277. 
24 . . 'id. at 313-320. 
. 25, Id. at 318. 
26. See,, e.g.~ Podbere~ky- ~- Kinvan 38 :J;?,3d 
147, 95 .. Ed.Law Rep .. 52 (4th Cir.. 1994) 
'(finding \hcit University' ·of Maryland's schol-
arship _program_ for African-American stu-
dents \V,aJ '. not narrowly,_ tailored);' Hopwood 
' v. Texas '73 F.3d 932, 107 Ed.Law Rep. 552 
(5th· Cir. 1996) (finding UniverSitys ·race~ 
conscious admissions policy unconstitution~ 
al); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law -Sch., 233 
F.3d 1188, 149 Ed.Law, Rep. 347 (9th Cir, 
2000) (upholding university's ·race~conscious 
admissions ptilicy); JohnsOil v. Bd. of Regent~· 
[3] 
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and medical schools interpreted Bakke as the legal standard for creating race-
conscious admissions program policies that would pass constitutional muster. 
Racial ,diversity had been validated as a ,compelling state objective by the . 
Supreme Court. So for,· the next fifteen years, universities would not be 
subject to federal judicial review of affirmative action measures because.the 
Supreme Court deferred to the judgment of the federal government, states, 
and institutions of higher education to utilize race as a .factor in developing 
programs for equity. purposes; however, in the •mid-1990s challenges would 
emerge and continue to the present. 
G1utter v. Bollinger & Gratz v. Bollinger 
·., ' ' ' '· '1, . • .. , ' 
Over a couple of _decades and many lower court decisions, the Supreme 
Court provided clarity about the rtppi'opriate use of race in G1utter v. 
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, both decided in 2003. The 6-3 Gratz decision 
struck down the undergraduate admissions program at the University of 
Michigan because it held that the automatic designation of twenty points on a 
100-point scale to every applicant.from an.underrepresented minority group 
was, not -narrowly tailored not a holistic approach." Quota systems insulate 
certain, applicants from competition with others based. on race or ethnicity." 
Unwilling, to accept ·the University of Michigan's indefinite use of race as a 
consideration •factor, Justice. O'Connor suggested, "We expec.t that 25 years 
from.now the.use of racial preference wilVno longer be .necessary to further 
the.interest approved today."''· However, in G1utte1; the University of Michi-
gan law school's admissions program satisfied Bakke because it. considered 
each.applicant as an individual, looking at bow ,each may.contribute to the 
diversity,. of the school and using race and .ethnicity .only, as a "plus'' in 
addition to other., characteristies,30 In a 5.,,4 decision, the G,utter Court 
adopted ,Justice Powell's ruling in Bakke finding race could be, considered in 
a\Jmissions practices.so long as lt was one of.the many factors .considered:'! 
The Supreme Court. upheld the reasoning that student body diversity.• is, a 
compelling state .interest." . · 
The Grutter Court also requil'ed admissions programs to consider other 
criteria beyond grades' and test scores, such" as·· the. applicant's personal 
statement, the quality of the undergraduate institution, letters Ohecommen-
dation, and whether the applicaiit ·chose challenging undergraduate courses, 
among other criteria· set by the institution." This holistic review could also 
examine one's study abroad ·exp·eriences, language proficiencies, and record 
of community service." The Court found narrow tailoring does not require 
"exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative" be attempted 
before a race-conscious policy is implemented, but' it does require that 
universities consider race-1\eutral plans in good faith.35 Up until now, this 
approach to admissi01,1s has , su1vived the strict scrutiny test while under 
. of the Unil', of o«,, 263 .F.3d, 1234, 156 
Ed.Law Rep. 829 (11th C/r. 2001) (finding 
University's race-conscious admissions. policy 
unconstitutional), 
27. Id. at 250-60. 
28, See G,utter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
29, See G1·qtz, 539 U.S. 244, 344-34.7., 
[4] 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35, 
Id. at 328. 
Id. at 312. 
Id. at 320-25. 
See id. at 339. 
See id. at 340. 
Id. 
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review of the U.S. Supreme Court.36. However, recent cases, such as the grant 
of certiorari of Fisher 11'1 and the• filing of cases against Harvard University 
and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill by the,Students for Fair 
Admissions, Inc., 38 -suggest that universities may no longer. be able to admit 
·students with this approach. This potential change will be discussed later ii) 
the article, The G1utter Court mentioned "the deviation from the norm of 
equal treatmept of all racial and ethnic gfolips is a temporary matter ... "39 
Oivbn that only over a decade laier since the Supreme Couri ruled on the 
constitutionality of race-conscious 'higher editcation ~driiission programs and 
evidence of institutidnal radslll is' still embedded iri American society,'
0 it is 
ptematitte for today's U.S. Supreme Cotlrt justices to reverse its previously 
held 'precedence. · · " · ' · · ·" ·. · ' ' · . · 
·' -, ' . ' . --
_, -, ' ', \, ' 
Ftsherv, The University of Texas at.Austin (F'isher,J) 
,,,In 2008, Abigail Fisher claimed racialdiscrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause because she was denied admission to The University 
of Texas at Austin (UTA). Based on current legal prececjence, UTA consid-
ered ,race as a ,factor arµorig ril~ny others, arid .it currently, admits students 
through a two-step process based on 'state and federal law.41 First, under the 
! ' ' '· ' . ·) '. ·. ' '·_, . ,, ' . ' ,' ' -' 
state's Top Ten Percent Law, high school students whCl graduate, m the top 
ten percent 6ftheif class. are eligible. for automatic 'admission to any public 
c6iiege or university in T~icas.42 The Top Ten JJercent 'Law was passed in 
• ; '' " • • . ' ; ,J • • )) ' ', . ' • 
', " • '. 
• ' 
response to the qechny m mmClnty .student enrollment. after the dec1s1on m 
Hopwood v. 1'exa~.".The law also suggysledthat pµblic universities' consider a 
variety of ot.herj'actors in adn)lssions decisions for students not eligible under 
the law, whi,;:h inclu,c\ed sodoeco,nomic status, bilingual proficiency, and first-
generation col1eg~ student statl.\s,4' · , . · . . •· , 
In, Hopwood, four White applicaµts who were denied admission to the 
Unive1:sity of Texas's law school were successful in their. reverse discrimina-
tioµ laws11it against th\\ state of .Texas .. and the. law school. The plaintiffs 
challenged the race-conscious admissio11s program which allowed admissions 
officers .to consider an, applicant's "background, Hfe .. experiences,, and out, 
look"" in addition ,t,o LSAT and undergraduate ec!.ucation,,4,6 .. They alleged .a 
violation of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause because the use .of 
race as a consideration factor resulted in the admittance of students of color 
. 
' ' ' ' 
36. See Eckes, sllpra note 15. , -· 
37,• ' Fisher v. UrtiVersity of Texas at Au_stin; No. 
,09-50822 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014), available 
" a~: , _ http:/1'vww.ca5.uscourts.g?vfoJ?iniqns/. 
pub/09/09-5082Z-CV2.pdf. 
38'. Stud~nts for Fair Admissions v, The Presi-
dent and Fellows of Harvard College,- et al., 
No, 1:14-cv-14176--DJC, 2014 WL 6241935, 
1
' (D.Mass. November 17, 2014); Students for 
Fitir Admissions v. ·University of North Car-
plina, et al., No. 1:14-cv-00954,. 2014 WL 
6386755 (M.D.N.C. Novem\,or 17, 2014). 
39. See Gm/le,; 539 U.S. at 344-347. 
4.0. David H.K. Nguyen, "Jessica Ulmi Col-
leen Chesnut, and . Suzanne Eckes; ' Sh'ict 
Scmtiny & Fishe1:· The Cowt's· Decision & It's 
lmp//cations, 299 Ed.Law Rep. 355 (January 
30, 2014). 
41. Fisherv. Untv,.ofTex..atAustin, 133.S.Ct. 
2411, 24.13, 2?3 Ed.Law Rep. 588 (2013), 
42. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 51.803 (West 
2009) ("Texas Top Ten Percent. Law''), · 
43. Hopwood v. Tex,, 78 F,3d 932, 107 Ed. 
Law Rep. 552 (5th Cir, 1996).' 
44, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.805, (West 
2009), 
45. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d. at 935, 
46. Id. 
[5] 
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EDUCATION LAW REPORTER., 
while their White peers with comparable profiles were,denied admission.47 
The federal district court mled in. favor of the law, school based on its 
argument thaMhe prograni addressed the pervasive history of societal racial 
discrimination so , the •use of., race or ethnicity as a factor in admissions 
procedures was constitutionaL48 
' In coritrast, the Col)rt of App~als for the' Firth Ci~cuit reiected "Ju~ticb 
Pow~ll's Compro~1ise" and· ruled · race coulcl no( be us,ed in ,the l,aw scjioo) 
,admissions process because achieving diyersfty using race or ethnicity was n.ot 
.. _-; . 't·••r•,, ·. ,. · ·-·,, ·I · .' · ·. · ',;, ·• ,. 
deemed a co)llpelling state 'interest,49 'f;he court further reasoned that rectify-
ing past discrimination was.119t an acceptable reasqnfor.t/ie'progrnm,bec,ause 
ti,e· law s~hool had no prior Ii'istory of discriminatory practices ag~,in~t p~opj~ 
of color.50 In light of, Hop!l'ood it was no surprise that .race wa,s ~ot a 
consideration factor. Although students are automatically eligible 'under the 
Top. Ten Percent Law, it does not necessarily mean that they are automatical-
ly,admitted to their institution of choice. · , i 
' Sec~ndly, based updri the Grulter v. Bollinge/· decision, applicants who 
are not eligible ubdei' the state's Top Ten Percent Law could be considered 
using '.the Grutter standard, which. comd~ered race as O,;teof many '"pltls 
factors" that each can.didate contributes to the learriing enviibnmerit.""hie 
Dniver~_ity asked, students tp iden!ify. th~ir; ,·ace ~~on/l fiye pre~efin~d racial 
categones, and race was 11ot assigned a numencal value . but considered a 
myariip,,ul factor.'•2 T~~:,v~rio~~ plusf~dors .~a9,,th~B_pJ9tte~ on a grid.and 
stµdents above a specific baselme wer,e offered adm1ss1on wlule othern were 
not'." Fi~her claimep that she was di~c'rimi,natiicj ag~inst peca~se'the Unl\ie1·~i-
ty used' 'the Grutter-based race-conscious admissions process after admitting 
' , ,,:, -:_. '··.' , _. ·.11,,. '!l•l'' ;·;( ,·_. 
students through the Texas-legislated Top Ten Percent Law. The D1sttict 
Cciurt found' the University's p<'>licy''cbnstltutional:54 ·On appeal, the :Fifth 
8ircuit Court of Appeals tuied the polib)' was not akhl to ah illegal q\Jota•oi-
nicial ·balancing and 'affh'med the'District', Court's 'findlng/l 1The Fifth Circuit 
interpreted G,utter tb•give substantial'defetence to·the University tb define 
· the benefits of diversify that 'provide the' 'c0mpe11ing' state" interest and 'to 
deterniine · whether· ifs• admission 'plan is· narrowly ··tailored to achieve 'this goat.:· ' '.,.,'' .) : i' ); -,- ' ,1.1 ··>. ;:;;(:, _;., ;.·!;:.'_'.·, ,,;: ,' (•',' \'' 
1 \ . : ,:, .:·;r_,;. ,,;:_-;; ·,; ,:; , ;", , 1 ::, , ;•.;·, < i ·, ! '-- ,· . ' 
The Supi'eme Court granted certiorari and held 7-1 that the· Fifth 
Ch'cuit. Court failed to,properly apply strict scrutiny. Justic~ Elana Kagan 
recused · herself ,from. '·'participating hl . the· Fisher . . cases . ,because ,she, was 
Solicitor General when the Department of.Justice filed' an amicus cu1iae brief 
in support of the University of Texas while the case was pending before the 
Fifth' Circuit." The Court vacate□ and remanded the case back to the Cii'cllit 
47, I,d. ,at 9:)8,. 
48, N, at939., 
49. Id. at 944. 
50, , fd. at 951;, 
51. See Fisher, 133 S.O. at 2413. 
52. Id. 
53. See id. 
[6] 
,,.,1 
, ' ' '' 
,,·, ,) s4.,,,Se,t 
55 . .,,FM1er v ... Univ. of Tex;:Cfl Austin, ,ti:31 ._g3d 
,, 213; 264 Ed.Law Rep. 564 (5th Cir. 2011). 
s6: . _ :s't1ePhe~ · ·w~rmiel, 'Jus;ice · Kagan 's·'_Recu-
, ,als, storusB£'od (oct. 9: iotz), http:// 
www.sCo'tUsblog.com/2012/10/scotus~for-law-
. s_tu9Hnts-spons.ored-byr!Jlooffiberg-Jaw-
, -;, j ustice-kagans-r;~cusals/. 
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Court.57 While the Fisher I Court·.reaffirmed the 
constitutionalitrof Grutter-
based admissions programs •that considered, 
•~racial· minority status as a 
positive cir favorable factodn •a university's adm
issions process, with the goal 
of achieving ,the educational benefits of a mor
e diverse student body;''/' ,it 
stressed, as outlined in. Gratz and Grutter, that, th
ese admissions ,processes 
must undergo the strictest standard of judicial. review.
59 Justice Kennedy in 
Fisher I agreed with the Cirpuit Court that th~ U
niversity has the expertise 
and exp'erie11cy to determine the scope of ,dive_r
sity and how it would benefit 
frs"campus, students, faculty, and staff, H?wev
'er, JusticbKeririedy did Mt 
agree to th~ fovel cl de_fetenc~ th_a_t the}9wer couri' gav\' to·. the Uni\ieisity'pn 
how it implemented tbis admissions plan.
60 Jtistic!"- i<.enAedy'wrote, '' ... theti; 
m,ustbe a further judicial d!itermiµation tli~t. the '~clmjssion
 process m.,;_~ts 
strict scrutirly in its' impfomentation. The.'University 'must 'i#ove that' its 
chosei1 means, to attain diversify arenarrqwly
 titikired."61 fostice Kerirtedy 
s'tres~ed 'on thi~ prong or' strict Scruti1w 
1th~. Unlve;sity. i~ lo . rec'eive no 
clefetenc(/'. C9mplying wjtli ih,is r~tio~~le ~d11_ld ~iw~ ~e'lt1ired the l?wer 
court to test whether there was no other alterna
tive to achieve· \he benefits of 
div6tsity than this 'adtnissio.ris plari. 
'' ' 
'/ ,',, , ·: ; .• i · ), , ·; 
, 1 ·1:' · : · - c;· i , . . " 
. ; • ,. , 1'. I, . ... 
. , 
. ,Howev~r, the. Circui(C9urt 1),C:Jted,thatit .was "/~-equi11
pei:I'.'. to n1akt; 1this 
,~ferminatiqn and. thatit1only nyeded .tp .en~ure \IW V11i\'.\lrsity ll\~
.<lf' il,gqq<;I 
f~itp., effort to consider ~lternatiy~s.~. Justicl' K
el11}e4y, 4i~agre~d. ~tating tµr 
Circuit Court ,defei;red fpe narrow tailmiog a11
alys\sJp the,,Univ,irsity'~.gqod 
faith 'Yithout cppsidering evideµce suffid<rntly.
64 
'\\'.hile. the Supreme C,ourt _in 
Fisher I ,did not _ov,errule the use. pf race-.c1msc_ious
. a\11;1\ssions. policies. \lPheld 
in .the previous Orutter, d,ecision, dissen\ing Jqs_t
iqes. Scalisi and T,lipmas 
s4pported the no\ion for, doing so.
65 
,In sµa,)'p cqn,tras,t, Jus.fice. Ginsl;,,t1rg, 
argue_d .that i+nder. strict. 5ccrutiny the; Uniyersif
Y's. p9lky. do~s not r,quire 
fur\her, judicial,rnview,,al)P i\s use_,qf ,ace ~s aJaqtor continufcs .to
 serve an 
important purpose in helping the . uniyer~i,ty 
to increase the . educational 
.benefits qf dive,rsity." 1\1 addition,. sh,e argued tpat cpfo
rblind, race-neµtral 
policies, su~h as Texas' Top Ten Percent .Law, 
'Yhich are s4ppos~9 to _be less 
dis~rirniµa\ocy alternatives to nice-conscious pla
ns,_are actµally.~y,110 mea\ls 
ra,.e-neutral. 67 
011 remand, . the Circuit Court · of Appeals he
ard the case again. The 
·appeals court gave the attorneys. a, list of ques
tions .to consider ,at this next 
level. The list of questions addressed ,everything 
from whether the case .is now 
moot because Fisher graduated from another
 institution, Louisiana State 
\Jniversity, to whether the appeals court or. di.str
ict court should h,iar the next 
ctound. The. Circuit Court had the option of ruli
ng .on the constitutionality of 
the .plan or sending the case down to the,
,district court to determine 
additional facts involving the plan. Attorneys f
or Fisher urged the appeals 
,57, Fisher, 133 S.Ct. 2411. 
58, Id. at 2417. 
59, Id. 
60, Fishe1·, 133 S.Ct. 2411. 
61, See id. 
62, See i<I. 
63. , Fisher v, UniVi of Tex. at AuStin, 631 F.3d 
· -213, 231, 264''Ed.Law Rep, 564 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
64, Id. 
65, Fisher, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2422. 
66, Id. at 2433-2435. 
67, Id. 
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court to rule on the case while the University requested the case be sent back 
to the district court in order to gather additionaHacts about the admissions 
policy." The Circuit Court found merit with Fisher's position· by stating 
"there· are no new issues of fact that need to be resolved, nor is there. any 
identified need.for additional discovery; that the record is •sufficiently devel-
oped" ... and• •a remand "would likely result in duplication of effort"." 
. Some scholars .suggest the Supreme Court w.anted the lower court to 
make it 111or~ challenging for' cci)leges ,and universities to impl~111erit r~ce-
cqnscfous admi,ssions plans,70 Howevei', the.Circuit Coµrt jn a 2-1 decision 
found merit again \j'it,h the University's plan bei11g donstiiutionally sound in 
both prong~ of the 'stdct scrutiny ~nalysis by,. befog narrowly tailore.d to 
achieve divtirsity. The court began its', discussion by restating 'the !>upre111e 
Couri's precedent in GruUei that ''strjct synttmy 111usf be applied tci an:, 
admissions program \lSil/,g ra<::ial categories or cl,assifications".71 The court 
acknowledged that Justice Kennedy's ,Fishe1: dissent ''fatdted the district 
couri's and this Court's review 'of UT Austiri's means. · to ad1ieve the 
permissible goal of diversity.'..whether UT Austin's efforts. were narrow!:, 
tailored to achieve the end of a diverse student body''." Before proceeding 
wiih"its'analysis; the court declared "our charge is to give exacting scrntiny to 
tnese'efforts"." After a detailed discussion of the Top Ten Percent Plan artd 
the University's additional admissions· office· diversity efforts, the court 
reiterated the G,utter precedent, "narrow tailoring does"ndt require exhaus-
tion 'of every race neutral alternative" but rather "s6rious, · good faith 
consideration of workable race~neutral alternatives that will · achieve· 'the 
diversity the university seeks,"74 The court asserted "put simply, this record 
shows that UT· Austin·. implemellted .· every race'neutral effort that its detrac-
tors 'now insist must be• exhausted prior to· adopting a race-conscious ad.mis-
sions program-in additipn to an · autdinatic adn;iissioris plan not' required 
under Gruttei' that ~dmits $0% of the'studeht!)ody with no 'facial use of race 
at all"." The ·court then brilught attention, to the circumstances 'under which 
the plan exists, :"the sad truth is that'the Top Ten·Percent Plan gains diversity 
from a fundameiital weakness in the Texas secondary· educalfoii'systein."76 
The court shared data in a footnote to support its assertion, "the· de facto 
segregation of schools in Texas enables the Top Ten Percent Plan to increase 
minorities in the mix, while ignoring contributions to diversity beyond race."77 
The court viewed the Top Ten Percent Plan "nearly indistinguishable from 
the University of Michigan's Law School's program in Grutter"78 and "was a 
necessary' and enabling component of the Top Ten Percen.t·Plan by allowing 
UT Austin to reach a· pool of minority and·· non-minority·' students with 
records of personal achievement, higher average test scores ·or other unique 
68. Lyle Denniston, Next Round in Fisher 
Case, SCOTUSBLO0 (Sep. 12, 2013), http:// 
1' www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/next-round-in-
fisher-case/. 
69. Fisher v. Univ. of Tems at Austin, 7S8 
F.3d 633, 642, 307 . Ed.Law Rep. 6.6.1 (5th 
Cir, 2015). . 
70. See Nguyen, et al., supra note 31. 
71, See Gmtter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
[8] 
72. Fisher, 758 F,3d 633, 637. 
73. Id. 
74, See Gmtter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
75. See Fishe1~ supra note 58, at 649. 
76. Id. at 650, 
77, Id. at 651. 
78. Id. at 653. 
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skills."7,9 Persuaded by the University's admission plan and and its implemen-
tation; the court stated "to deny , UT Austin its limited use of race in its 
search for holistic diversity would hobble the richness. of the educational 
experience in contradiction of the plain teachings of Bakke and Gn,tter. "80 In 
its final opinion sentence the court' invoked two of the four seminal race-
. conscious cases, "to reject the. UT Austin plan is to conf<;mnd developing 
principles of neutr.al affirmative action, looking :away from Bakke and Gmtter, 
leaving them il) uniform but.without comman,;l,due only a courtesy salute in 
passi;ng."81 
In his 26-page dissent, Judge Emilio M. Garza argued the University did 
Hot 'ilefili.e• "critical mass" and therefore "whether- the' University's use of 
taclal classifications in its admissi'ons process is narrowly tailol'ed to its stated 
goal ... remains unkrtoWn.''82 He accused the majority·:of ''defer[ing] imper~ 
miiisiblfto the University's claim'; arid asserted "this deference is squarely ai 
odds with' the centrallesson of Fisher."" Ultimately, Judg\i Garza co,ncluded 
ihai the University had not satisfied the narrowly tailored prong and there-
fore he would have reversed the court's· previous decision and rulea in' favor 
of Fisher. Fisher has yet td be concluded; The ·Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
entered iis ruling on July 15, 2014, in favor of-the University and the en bafio 
. request made by Fisher's' legal· teami>was' denied. Fisher filed a :second 
petition for certiorari, which the Supi"enie Court granted. N0w the Court Will 
decide if the strict scrutiny two 0 prohg test was properly applled on remand by 
the Fifth Circuit'in Fisher I. 
'•• Oral arifunents of Fisher v .. Th~ Uni~~rsity of Texas at Austin (Fisher II)' 
, .On December 9, 2015, ,the Supreme Cou1t heard another challenge 
~gainst the, University. The s.ame. attorneys for; .both parties, who argued, in fisher I on October 10, 2012 ,;lid so in Fisher II almost three years.,Bert.Rein, 
a-founding partner of.a Washington, I).C. based law firm, Wiley Rein, LLP 
represented Abigail Fisher. Gregory Garre, the 44th J..T.S .. Solicitor· General 
cluring,the George W. Bush admipistration and currept partner ~t LatJ,am & 
Watkin_s, representecj tl1,e University of Texas ~t Austin (UTA) and the 
9µrrent U.S. So!idtor,9eneq1l D9nald B, VerrHli, Jr. argued as (Ill amicus 
· culiae suprorting UT A. During the. oral arguments the justices excluding 
Jµ,stice, Clarence ,Tpomas. posed. severa/. qtiest,ions to attorneys on both. sides. 
Aliigail Fisher's Argument 
Attorney Rein was in the midst of outlining the burden on UTA to show 
evidence that it met the two-prong strict scrutiny standard when ·Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor interrupted him. Justice Ginsburg first. inquired 
whether there would be a case if the Top Ten Percent Plan was eliminated 
and only the Gn,tter-like plan remained.84 Attorney Rein responded that the 
current plan was not in compliance with Grutter because "it's not aimed at a 
critical mass" and before he could proceed much further, Justice Sotomayor 
posed additional questions appearing not be satisfied with Rein's response. 
79. Id. 
so. Id. at 662. 
81. Id. at 660, 
82. Id. at 662. 
83. Id, 
84, Oral Argument at 4, Fisher v. University 
of Texas at Austin, No. 14-981, 2015 WL 
8482483 (S. Ct Dec. 9, 2015). 
[9] 
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For example, she asked how UTA had improperly used race in conflict wlth 
the Bakke standard;" Attorney, Rein responded that Bakke and GrUtter 
established a requirement of individual applicant profiles being compared to 
each other to determine selection based.on the "context of the class and the 
educational experience" which, is a stated goal of the institution.~' 
·' Justice Kennedy entered the• discourse by 'explaining thaHhe Top·Ten 
Perceht Law was a result of the decisioh made by •the Fifth Circuit CourH,f 
Appeals in Hopwood v. • Texas. 87 fostice Xehnedy,"who has been labeled · a 
swing voter in civil rights related cases, asked attorney Rein to give an 
eJ<ample ota,concr<,te criterion that th\1 university wo.uld be able,to .use to 
achi\)ve diversity." Rein clicl not give ,a direct response. to t)le',questiou in.stead 
lie, argm,d ,that, the. ~91jcitpr. general, woulc,l · aHempt . to, transfo,m "abstract 
gpals ipto. cpncre,te opj..,ctiv"'s".89, Justice .Scalia inquire,! a.bm;t vyhet~er th.ere 
hacj,been ,cri\icaj ma,ss ~tud\es. col)ductetj, and h9w w,ould the university lq)oyi 
when, if had reached ,a sufficient number, of students of color.'° Rein stated 
the .UIJiJ'.~rsity utilized a good fa/th app~oach th,~t pa,ssed llll/S\<"r )¥ith a 
majori,ty in .thp Fiftl;i ,Circuit bu( not with.)be Supr~me Co1gt.'1 , . , , . , 
,,Justices ,I~ennedy and Alito,seemed concerned that additional facts were 
needed. for :the Coprt .to make a ,sound, d.ecision:,sucb a,s .if tbere,w.as 
information about the mimb,11r of.students ,of color, admitted in the additional 
holistic revis')Y process that considered ,race vrrsus, th.e, admitted students; of 
cqlor in the, ,Top, ,J;en,, fNcent ,l;'lan,011ly'f , aµ,d, vvi/)1p11t that data -Ju~tice 
Kennedy said "we're just arguing the same case.:;" .•,Puring ;the just/ces' 
exchanges with ,attorney Rein, it apl?eared, questions abo~tthe process to 
achieve 'classi·oom diversity were not addressed to 'several' justices'' satisfac-
tion.'l • When 1Justice' Kennedy inquired if there was evidence of UT A's 
holistic.,review prdcess actually being a quotaj'attorney:Rein•asserted •Flsher 
had 'not raised 'that•claim but he did' accuse t!lTAdf using an· approach·that 
was '"masked ~nd hidden" ·because the universiiy• had ,a' goal that was hMvily 
focused·onincreasirig the'numbers•of.studertts•of color195 ;,, · ,, , 
' It\ the ia,s,dew ininute's of bis tliii~, Jus\icii'O)risbtirg inquired' alfoutwhiit 
type of relief; if aily, Fisl)er was _ seeking froni tfre Collrt sin2e sh~ had 
graduated and tnete was 1\ot. a' class actioil stilt!" Atto,rney 'Rein responded 
that Fisher was entitled 'io'her applicatici'tl refuil(I due to' being subjected to 
aihinfair review process,' trilrisportatidn costs for' attendirig ·an out of state 
institution, and the denial of future earnings since she·did not earn\a'·UTA 
dewee.", . - , , ; , - . . 
University, pf;Tex{ls at A1,1sti11 's Argument ,, , 
' Attorney Garre began his 'argument 'oh ·behalf•of•UTA•with- an-.attempt 
to answer three questions with one being why the holistic review pr0cess' that 
,'' 
8,5, Id. at 50 6, 
86,, Jd, 
87: ; '.'fd.; !lt 11 (see ·llop,Vood v, Ta, 78 F.3d: 
932, 107 Ed.Law Rep. 552 (5th Cir. 1996)); 
88, Id. 
s9. Iii. at 12. ·· 
,,, -. 
90. Id, at 12--13, 
[10] 
:!l, .. 
91. 
92, 
93;· 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
~d, at 13. ), 
rd. at!~, · 
Id. ;at 20. 
Id, 
Id. at 34-35. 
Id. at 35. 
Id, at 36-37, : d. 
. 
;j 
,1 
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urAused is constitutionally pennissible, He asserted that the Texas legisla-
ture concluded "in 2009 that the holistic plan at issue was· 'a necessary 
complement to the State's Top 10 Percent Law."98 He emphasized that "the 
FifthCircuit found that without the consideration of race in the nlix for those 
studertts, 'admissions would approach an "all-White 'enterprise."'' ,Justices 
A1ito'<1tid Keririecly challenged attorney Garre in the same manner as they 
l:tad·with attorney Rein and 'attorney Garre'also did not have data'bn how 
inariy SttideMs of colot were admitted through the holis.tic review process but 
would not 'have been selected if the holistic review plan that included race 
was n'ot' ill ieffect.100 •Justice Breyer joinea the discussion:by' reading two 
passages' frofu the Court's Fishel' T decision. First, ''The decision· to put~ue the 
educational benefits tMt flow froin student diversity is in substantial ·ineasure 
an academic judgment tb which sortie, but ilot c6111plete, judicial deference is 
proper'." An,d second1 ''The' University itmst provide a, quote; 'reasoned, 
principled explanation for tl\e academic decision 1to pursue divetsity,"'101 He 
immediately commented,, "Your plan isplirsuing diversity "among 'tlie' 25 
1;ercent who ire nofadmitted under the top 10 plan.,"1°' Here Ju~t(l:e Breyer 
was giving attdrney'Garre·an opportunity'to get·to the main issue for the 
Coiirt to 'consider, wliether'race can be used' an as additio'nal' consideration 
fadtor tb obtain the 'iJhiverSity's goal of )ncreasin~ diversity be'ydnd the race 
neutral Top •Ten ·Percent Law.· A/toriley GaNe 'responded to Justice Bteyer's 
qiiesti'on by ciiing the Suppleilierit joint appendix and deposition testimony' of 
Mo UTA' admissions officers which supporled the' university's posHkn1 'that it 
had clearly' outHned why and how "it was pursuing the educaHonaf benefits of 
diversity in a broad sense"1q3 and Hs. procedure µad been appro".ed by tl\e 
Stlpren\e'Cotitt's precedence in'Grutter:· " .. · "'' . ·•r. . ' · 
. ' , ,, ,:1,., ; r ' 
Chief Justice Roberts al1mg with Justices Scalia, Alita, and Kennedy 
posed questions that reflected a skepticism about whether th'e 'University had 
met· its burden 'of persuasion by providing ·endiigh evidence to siipport its 
additional use of race in the 'admissions.process. Chief<Justice Roberts asked 
aUorney ·Garre •if the 25'-year end to affirmat,ive action suggested by' 'Justice 
Sandra Day'O'Connor fo Grutter Would expire 'within twelve yearsi!01 Garre 
responded that systematic problefus in K-l2, specifically test score disparities 
aldng racial lines 'inade a definitive answer difficult.105 ' · , · · · · · 
i . i,. Attbrnpy Ga:re contb.1aed to reiterate that th~ U1'A holis.tic revie~ plan 
iyas. iJ, ~Qfllpliance with the Grutter and Bakke standards. He petitioned the 
9:,urtnottQ decide "that University of Texas can't consider rnce, or . , . that 
univeisiiies that corisi°der race have to. die a death of ~ .thousand cuts for 
c\oing sci,1'106 ;ro support his piea, Garre pointed to the lack of diiersity that 
resultid oc,c,urted iri California and Michigan institutions of higher ~dµcation 
afterthe enactment of state lawsthat pi'ohibit .the use of ~ace by any 
g,9yeinin~~t actor fo;· ~mployment arid education decisi.ons.107 '. ' 
98, Id. at 38. 103. Id. at 46-A7. 
99, Id. at 39. 104. Id. at 49. 
100. Id. 105, Id. 
101. Id. 45--46. 106. Id. at 6&-67. 
102, Id. 107. Id. at 67. 
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Justice Scalia interrupted attorney Garre's closing arguments by making statements that admission to UTA is more harmful than hurtful to Black students. "There--are there those who contend that it does not benefit African,Americans to-to get them into the University of Texas where they do not do well, as opposed to having them go to a less-advanced school, a less-a,slower-tracl; school where they do well,"108 He supported his assertion by referencing a11 amicus.cwiae brief submitted that stated "most of the black scientists in this country don't come from schools like t)le University of Texas, ,, . They come from lesser schools where they do not feel that they',r(l-,--that they're being pushed ahead in-in cfasses that.are too-fastfor them."109 Despite attorney Garre's attempt to respond to Justice Scalia, hi} continued "I'm just not impressed by th!' fact that-that the University of Texas may have fower. Maybl' it ought to have fewer. And maybe some~yoµ know, when you take more, the number of Blacks, really competent Blacks· admitt.ed to ,lesser schools, turns out to be less. And-and I-I don't thinkit-it-it stands, to reason that it's a good thing for the University of Texas to admit as many macks as possible., I. just don't thinl,;-."uo Attorney Garre was finally allle to ad,dr!='ss Justice Scalia's comments by stating, ''.This Court heard and rejected ,that argument, with respect, Justice Scalia, .i11 the G,utter case, a'Jase that mu; opponents haven't asked this Cqurt to overrule. If yoµ look a.t the academic _performance of holistic minority admits versus the top 10 percent admits, over /ime, they-they fa,re better."111 'J1!e Court stated in its J?isher I opi1;1ion th~t deference to university's decision making proced).ffes would not be give_n. unbridled deference, Justice Breyer reiterated this position during an excha11ge with the µniversity attorpey Gregory Garre in his final f,;,w minutes, " .. , this Court will give some, but npt complete, de(erence to what the University decides."112 
, , 
· u.s: Soiicitoi· General's Ai-gumetJt Suppr,1ting UTA 
i Solicitor General Verrilli shared time with ,attorney Garre to present the federal government's positio11 of support for UTA:s holistic review program. Chief Justice Roberts specifically asked, "How does the university know when it has achieved its pbjective?."113 The.solicitor general did. not dir<cctly answer the question but instead he focuse,l on ,how the proposed approach by Fisher's counsel of setting a demographic goal was not the ,solution, m, Be informed the Court that UT A's !!pproach of reviewing "concrete evidence" in the form of "well-<lesigned surveys of student attitudes and faculty attitudes. Graduation and retentio11 rntes. Are racial incidents going up .arid down-'up cir down ()n-on campus in' frequency"115 would deten;nlne when the universi-ty's diversity goal,has beeri reached. Chief Justice Roberts did not find merit with the solicitor'general's'response. Bevoiced concern about the amount of mi111b6rs referenced by UTA's attorney Garre and labeled the surveyii'that were issued to collect information from faculty and students as "kind of sophomoric."116 In a subsequent exchange, Justice Scalia challenged Solicitor 
108, Id. 113. Id. at 78, 109, Id, 
114. Id. at 79. 110. Id. at 67-68, 
115. Id. at 81. 111, Id. at 68. 
116, Id. at 82. 112, · Id. at 75. 
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General Verrilli's assertion that ,with only 300 to AOO students out of 6,000 
there .w,;rnld pe &<'material, risk, of racial isolation,"117 Justice _Scalia interrupt-
{d' wlth t!W ,~uestions "600 is going to make _a difference?" and "They 
wotilpn'tfiel isolated with (\00?'.,n' Solicitor General Verril)i responded t!iat 
'I sig~lfiiant diffe~enc\~oµld be ma_de _with a11 I ,aqditiona\ 209 students or 
c?]fff ad/i!/t,ted tp_ UTA . ,, . . . .... . ... 
,,. ,;Jn-an effort. to move the.Court in a different direction, Solicitor General 
:yerri1li referenced briefs submitted by the military in support of the UTA 
hoUsiio:review p;qgram and VGiced· cGncemthat without the cpnside1:ation of 
· r~~<l.:l.lw officer corps would· lack diversity in its leadership.120 Justice Alita 
immediately challenged this assertion by questioning -if the students of color 
a1witt<Jd und~r, thy Top Ten Percent plan would be i1,1ferior officers ,com-
pared tb those admitted . uncler the. h9listic review proce~~ which inch,ided 
:iace.121 Solicitor General Verrilli responded that no s\udents admitted to 
OTA would inferior fo thefrpeern and returned td his_ advocacy'for people of 
tdlqt'needed·ill'the ranks to have a diverse environment anil trnops.122 It was 
I(strategic maneuver to discuss• bi"iefs submitted by military leaders because 
they' seemed tb have influenced Justice O'Connor's vote and the C9urt's 
decision in Grutt'er. 
,_,;. ·,,·. : ' . ' 
)!(shei's 'Rebuttal 
I 
In, his rebuttal, attomey Rei11. informed the Court that a constant 
,question,t!iroughout the oral argum1mt .had l;lo_t be.en adequately, addressed 
whi.ch was "Wha\impact,dicl the_use,o(race actually,liaverl'3Attomey Rein 
refereqced Judge, Garza's dissenting opinion during the Fifth, ,Circuit Court's 
i_11itia\ 1,review of Fisher I in which Judge Garza's,calculation estimated the 
ponsideration . qf race made . an -insignificant impqct in the admission of 
stµcjeJ;1ts_.of color.121.Justic<'\ _Sotomayor-interrupted attorney Rein and aske_d if 
he)hough,t change happened overnight and before he could respond Justice 
Scalia: asked to hear more about the data frol)l Judge .Garza'.s findings.'" 
· . Attorney. Rein questioned UTA's-hojistic review process and stated since the· 
µnJve,sity could not show .hol'(, stµdents of color are admitted .it should no 
longer he able to use it. 126 · 
Fisher fl Ou/come .fossibi/ities 
" Based• on the questions presented in the oral argument by justices 'with 
differing: perspectives on the constitutionality of race0conscious admissions 
· J?blicfos; a •majority ofthe justices may remand the case back to the district 
cimrt_<for additional evidence gathering.- However, since there appeared not 
to be a Satisfactory response to the. use of race in the holistic' revieW process, 
a tnajoi"ity may rule the use-of race is unconstitutional because the university 
.<lid:not meet both prongs of the strict scrutiny standard as to why race is a 
consideration factor for the purposes of a •diverse student body especially 
~W-~e s_ome students of color are admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan, 
117, Id. at 83. 122. Id. 85. 
118, Id. at 84. 123, Id. at 89. 
119, Id, 124, Id.· 
120, Id. 125. Id, at 90. 
121, Id. 126, Id. at 93-94. 
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Current Status of Race-Conscious ·Admissions 
The 'current status of race-conscious admissions is uncert1tin,'With tlie 
rehearing of Fished! in' the Supren1e Court anq n~w legai cJ\alkmges agaii\st 
,Harvard. and, lJNG-Chapel Hill, there is a full:f)edged effort tQ' dlimit\at'e' 'race 
as one o'f the many 'factols in admissions decisions and 1 the aHilify' of 
institutions of higher education to shape the diverse mak.i-up'oftheit student 
bodies. The Supreme Court· may 'either eliminate the use of race-conscious 
admissions; make •it more challenging for institutions td utilize, or heighten 
the sttict Scrutiny'standard impa'cting affirmative action ptogtams broadly. 
The following' section provides infotmation on the current challenges against 
Harvard and UNC~Cliapel Hill. . . . 
. Students foF Pair Admissions, 'inc . . v. Ha,van( 'and Students fb, 'Fair 
Adn1issior/s ~- Univernity of Noi'/h Caro/ina-'-Chapel Hill . . . 
011 !v!ond~y, Nove~per 17, ,201( twq separate, lawsuitt :wer,e filed 
~gains! Harvard Universi.ty,and,the Univ.ersi.ty of North Carol/m1-.Chapel Hill 
by, a "newly;fonn,ed,;:ponpro~it, member~hip organization whose,mein,9ers 
include hjghly, qualified· stµd,ents recently, denied admissions .to both schools, 
highly qualified students who plan to apply to both schools, anq their 
parents.""' The 120-page complaint against Harvard accuseq the Universi.ty 
of "employing racially and ethnically discriminato1y policies and procedures 
in••administering the undergradtrate admissions program at Harvard College 
in'violation of Tltle'VI of the'Civi!Rights Act df'l964:"1" The plaintiffs also 
claith that Harvard's cii.1rrent' program has· resulted in a, limited number of 
qualified Asian-'-Amerfoans · admitted yeal'ly to the univerSity;129 Project 'on 
Fair Representation (POFR)'s executive dir~ctor; Edward Blum;' helped· to 
fund'this Iawsuii'as 'well as'l/lishet'v. Univei~ity of Taas. 1lrbnically, the suit 
ccimes • sue months after' POFR- launched 'a website soliciting '''students who 
cl_aith 'they were not admitted to Harvard because'oftheir race to participate 
in a potential lawsuit."130 Hal'vard1s •general 'counsel released a statement that 
referenced Justice--Powell's- opii1ion iii Bakke touting the university'B admis-
sions plan being 'legally sound' and alleged the University'has continued the 
same practice consistently over the years.131 · ·,' · .. ":,, · • 
Within the group of plaintiffs, there is at ,Ji,~st-o/ie Asian American who 
is,,a,first generation. college student,,graduated· top.of thyir high schofl)class, 
scored,~·· 36 on the, ACT,. and a_ctive • in multiple extracurricular actiyities, who 
was, denied .admission. ,to, Harvard, This, student will seek .a,,transfe.1·:. to 
Harvard if i.t no. longer, uses race ,or ethnici.ty In its admissions \preference' .. '.'~ 
In the, UNG-Chapel Bill complaint, the plaintiffs alleged the same ,violation 
of Title,VI 'and thaUhe.· Universi.ty cannot ,fulfill the strict. scrutiny ,stanqard 
upon constitutional n:vlew since in· the Universitfs. amicus. brief submitted in 
Fisher .. I the University stated; it could " ... maintain, and actually increase, 
127. oe1wicile, Thedd~r~ ··R.' suit' Aize~es 
Race-Based Disc,imination in Ha,vqrd Ad-
missions Practices, The Haivard Crimson 
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://.thecrims6n.coin/ 
article/2014/11/18/law-suit-admissions- . , 
alleged-discrimination/. 
128. Students for Fair Admissio,1s v, The Pres" 
ident and Fellows of Han,llrd College, et ·al,, 
[14] 
I_ '< /'. , . •. 
No. l:14-cv-14176-DJC, 2014 WL 6241935, 
(D.Mass, November 17, 2014)., 
129. Id, at 4. 
130, See Delwiche, supra note 65, 
131. Id. 
132, Id. 
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racial diversity through race-neutral 'means if it ends its !'ace-based affi1ma-
tive action policies",133 T6 date, no activity•has been,reported on either case 
moving forward .in the federal district courts, However, institutions of higher 
education and other I stakeholders should continue' to ,monitor 'these ·cases. 
Colorblind. Discourse 
Colorblind· discourse· centers "on' managing the· appearance' of formal 
equality with6ht worrying Over much about the consequences of •real-world 
inequality.' Proponents ,of 'a• •colorblincl •ethos· •define· freedom· arid equality 
exclusively' in terms 6f the'•autonomous-'-some would say atomii~d'indiviou~ 
al."'"• This "atomized•irtdividual"••is without a history and void of political 
affiliations or social·interactions. This'person exists'in an abstrabt world with 
eqtial opportunity, •aiid preferen6es rather 'than a racist( sexist, homophobic 
and socia'Uy stratified structure. We tise·colorblind discourse to examine these 
cases in a critical !eris to•understand 'the judicial approach in l'ace•cOnsdOus 
admissions.. ,;-, · 1 , ': ,\'ii 
'· Coiorbliridness in legal judsprJdence wi.s ,first intrOdlicei:I b:( Justice 
Harlan in his Plessy dissent; "Our Constitution is' 'coio\lblmd; and heltl\er 
,knows nortolenites classes among citizens".1,1~.Considering the preceding text 
to · this infamous .statement that has been adopted by, soi many" provides a 
complete and•accurate understanding of.Justice Harlan's viewpoint: 
The. White•race·deems itself to be·,the dominant race.in this country. 
,And•so,itis;•in prestige, in achievements,imeducation; in.wealth and in 
power. So, I· doubt ·not, <it.will ,continue, to., be for. all time, if it remains, 
, t~ue to its,g~e~t}1er.(\age a~d !1ol~s. {~S,\J? t.h~. principl~s :9f c9nstit~ti?n.al 
h~e~ty, ~4ty1 view, 9f_the C?,nflltu\1on, }n the we 9f_ tp~ l11w, ther~_i~ 11) 
. this country no supenpr, donunant, rulmg class of .~J!tzens,, The.i;e 1.s no 
. caste here. Our'Constitution is color-blind .... 136 . . ·. . .· .. 
,i!:,c•' \ '>. I ' ,' 
Colorblind Discourse Applied " · , , " 
:, In Bakke, ,Justice:Powell gives a different interpretation of the colorblind 
argument that ''pr9hibits the use of race as, ,the sole factor iri government 
decisions absent :a compelling justification."•"' Ironically, each Justice assert-
ed that his colorblind position was based Oil' ati' interpretation cif ·the 
Fourteenth i'\rnendment's Equal Protection Clause'. A critical distinction,,in 
both Justices' interpretations is that "Harlan believed that:the .Fourteenth 
Amendment"has special relevan.ce ;for· Blacks;,while· Powell .believed thl\t 
Blacks and Whites,must receive the same treatment."'",Bothinte1pretations 
1ead to different outcomes and not necessarily either will result .in justice ·tor 
people of ·color in admission• to: race-conscious ,higher education institutions. 
Justice Powell's version of colorblindness disconnects history ancheality from 
the Court's analysis. It allows• White privilege to. be unnamed, and avoids the 
133. Studeiit°ifor Fair Adritissiom' V. ·Uni\ierst{y· · 
of North Carolina, et al., No. 1:14J..cv-00954, 
2014 WL 6386755 (M.D.N.C. November 17, 
2014), at 26. 
134. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Ide-
ology of Colorblindness, In Gallagher,. C. 
(Ed.). Rethinking the Color Line: Readinw in 
Race and Ethnicity, 101, 105 (2014). 
135.' Plessf V, Ferguson 163 u'.s. 1537, 559 
(1896). 
· 136, Id, 
137.· C:rensh~\~, sup~a note 76, at, 247. · 
138. B.-K. Fair; FOrewOrd: Rethinking.the Co-
lorblindness Model. 13 Nat'l ,Black LJ. · 1, 2 
(1993), 
[15] 
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questioning of White supremacy and social dominance. Colorblind rhetoric distracts our society from .dealing, w,ith the complex nature of "race" and 
"racism." It has stalled the discussions· and actions of colleges.and universi-
ties as they.have adopted this.detrimental Utopian viewpoint. 
Whiteness being normal aligns with the rhetoric of innocence which is a 
concept discussed by legal scholar Ross (1990) as a legal tool used by White 
rhetoricians, lawyers and judges. He ass.erts the avoid_al)ce of Whites be11efit-
ting people, of color's oppression is a key component in. _the rhetoric .of innocence, because it "obscures this question: 'What White person is it1no-
cent, jf innocence is defined as the· absence of advantage at the expense of 
others?"''" Bakke is a11 -example in "'hich "J us.tice. Lewis Powell introduced 
th_e rhetoric of jnl)o<:ence to the Cour\'s affirm11tive actiqn ,discourse," which 
occurred throughout the opinion and the oral argument. In t.he Bakke 
opinion he_ stated, :,'the .patent .unfairness of ''.innocent persons ... asked to 
endure. , . [deprivation as] the price of membership in the domin_ant majori-
- ty ... forch:ig, innocent )),>rsons .... tn _bear the burdens of yed{yssing griev-
an,ces not 9f their making._"''° 
· · 
Derrick Bell voiced ,four key concerns y,ith diversity and described it as a 
"distraction'' to the achievement of racial justice,, First; the focus on achiev-ing diversity as a goal relegates systemic and structural societal barriers that have not been eradicated in our :Society: Belle stated'the "Michigan lawyers 
and civil rights allies-shifted the,focus·.from remediation for past discrimina-
tion -to the value of diversity• to the schools' and to society/''" 
. Second, "diversity invites further' litigation ,by offering a distinction 
without a .real difference between those tises of faceapproved in college 
admissio~s programs; and· those. in ,other far iliore Jmpbftant _ affinnative 
action policies that the Court has rejecfet:l.';142 Litigation' possibilities are increased by the Conrt's fragmented opinions in both Gratz and Grutiei:-Bell 
argned .''the •narrowness of this diversity "victory!' in ,the law school case and its vulnerability in futnre litigation oan be gauged by the G1utter dissents/?143 
Heavy criticism from the disagreeing jnstices of divt,rsity meeting the strict 
scrutiny standard and the lack of-definition, for "critical mass'! ar.e evidence 
that .the nse of race iil higher education :admissioris is not settled. Further proof of this turmoil is the Supreme Court's acceptanc" -of hearing Fisher a 
second thne .. This decision signals.to civil rights allies tliat. the Supreme Court is not in,agreement with the.Fifth Circnit Court of Appeals application of the 
strict,scr11tiny standard to nse race as factor,in conjunction with Texas's ;Top 10 .Percent Plan. There should be great ·concern that the decision will be 
-made through a colorblind constitntional analysis which would ,evadicate the 
use of race· in .any form as,an admission~ consideration factor,. 
Third,. Bell argued the myth of .meritocracy continues to prevail with 
achieving diversity as the forefront of 'race-conscious admissions disco.urse. He discussed meritocracy by, using Justice Thomas's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger that concurs in p_art and dissents in part. Thomas explained that he 
139. Thomas. -Ross, Just Stories: How the Law 
Embodies Racism and Bias. 301 (1996). 
140. Id. at 302. 
[16] 
141. · I4. at 1624--25. 
-142. Id, at 1622. 
143. Id. at 1627, 
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is:ai:1ti,affirmative action:because of "his i::onviction that all such remedies are 
unconstitutiona1"144 and his personal belief that "blacks can achieve in. ,;very 
avenue of American life without the meddling of university administra, 
tors,".145 Jµstice Thomas pointed out the fact of alumni's chil\!ren being 
specially,,admitted is. evidence of the l1;1ck of merit ,as a criterion, yet this 
gruup does not. draw , needed attention and )las n<Jt been included i1;1 
~ligation, Fourth in the diversity distractio.n argument is the lack of resources 
devoted to K-12 schools in impQ'ierished areas that produce students wlw 
~!'e npt equipped to excel in higher ec;!ucation equitable, to, t)leir peers.
146 
. ,,,·With the Court's majority members',,change in viewpoint of race: 
conscious ·admissions programs between Bakke and Fisher, the Court has 
established a challenging set. of '.'.doctrinal barriers that must be , overcome 
before a majoritarian affirmative action plan can be upheld."1
47 Having 
determined that strict scrutiny is the analysis tool to determine if a govern-
mental program meets a compelling state interest'and is narrowly iailored to 
achieve the stated interest in race-conscious higher education cases, the 
benefits of diversity and the Court's analysis has evolved into a position that 
"equate[s] benign discrimination with invidious discrimination, as if the 
harms that affirmative action imposes on Whites are equivalent to the harms 
that Whites have imposed on racial minorities."
148 Additionally, the Court at 
one-time viewed racial affi1mative action solutions as if there was inadequacy 
with proposed race-neutral measures. Based on the analysis of seven of the 
nine members of the Court and the lack of differences between Gratz and 
G1utter, the concern for a definitive standard is warranted. Ironically, Justice 
Kennedy stated that strict scrutiny "must not be strict in theory but feeble in 
fact,"149 which seems to be the same sentiment of two members of the 
conservative majority bloc. Justices Scalia and Thomas stated in G1utter that 
they did not find merit with "the educational benefits flowing from student 
body diversity"150 meeting the compelling state interest analysis. 
Implications of Fisher II and the Potential Elimination of Race-Conscious 
Admissions · 
The discourse in the Fisher II oral argument was focused on the number 
of students of color admitted through the holistic review process beyond the 
Top Ten Perce Law plan. Institutions of higher education should not wait for 
the Supreme Court's Fisher II ruling but instead review their admissions 
policies and criteria. If there is a holistic review utilized, the factors consid-
ered should be transparent to potential students via websites, printed materi-
als, and during on-campus recruiting events. Specifically, individual applicant 
review should consist of evaluating contributions in the form of various 
backgrounds and characteristics that align with an institution's goals for 
lnclusion.151 Additionally in 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice in conjunc-
tion with the Department of Education released a report
152 summarizing the 
144. Id. at 1629. 
·145, Seeid. 
146. Id. at 1622. 
147, Spann, siwra note 4, at 50. 
148. Id. 
149. See Fishe1; 133 S, Ct. at 2421. 
150. See id. at 2413. 
151. College Board and Education Counsel 
Report 2014 (n.d.), 
152. United States Department of Justice· 
and United States Department of Edu• 
cation, Guidance on the Voluntary Use of 
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Supreme ~ourt's Grutter/Gratrdecisions and providing examples fot·admis 0 sions practices that would be legal. One· of the recommendatiorls included· a top perce11tile program similar to• the one· challenged in Fisher I as well as using non-rice factors such as socioeconomic-and/or first generation•siatus to potentially draw students from different racial "and ethnic backgrounds.'" Programs like the Top Ten Percent Plan are in the balance uhtil the Supreme Court decides Fisher II. If' the Court chooses· to find the Top Ten Percent plan unconstitutional there could be 'negative implications for "economic or geographic diversity to the ei<terit'that those 'factors correlate to race."'" Institutions of higher education that target students ,using race-neutraUactors may have to cease or restructure their criteria if, a connection•can .be made,to rac.e, otherwise a poteritiaFfor. lawsuits alleging reverse discrimination'may be iµnninent. 1,_:_ -
:i; 
I 
')I'; : _1; • t' ,-, Race _to,;A_chieye l)lversfty in _Pqstsecon(la,y_ EduCOtton, 2004. 
- . ' ' 
., )" 
154.· Sp~rn,,srp1~-~w.t~,l,.~~,~~- ,tr· 
~f~· See id, 
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